3 matters'. The focus is on the quantification of shareholder protection rules, and on the contribution that such rules can make to a recent international corporate governance phenomenon, namely hedge fund activism. From a methodological point of view, this study falls into what is known as 'numerical comparative law'. This term refers to all kinds of quantitative comparative analysis using legal data. 15 The term covers both studies which try to establish a causal link between law and other variables ('statistical comparative law'), and studies which concern simple counts. 16 Its overall feature is that not only empirical data, but also the 'law as such', are translated into numbers.
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This article is part of a larger study examining the relationship between hedge fund activism and law. The study has been conducted on the basis of a heuristic model, in which an activist hedge fund campaign is viewed as a sequence of four stages: entry → trading → disciplining → exit. 18 Using this four-stage model several empirically testable hypotheses about the relationship between hedge fund activism and various legal rules, such as mandatory disclosure, ownership disclosure and shareholder protection, have been derived. In this article the focus is on the impact of shareholder protection rules on the entry stage of an activist hedge fund campaign. The hypothesis is that activist hedge funds should primarily target companies incorporated in countries with stronger shareholder protection regimes. This claim is tested by means of statistical analysis using leximetric coding to account for shareholder protection and a hand-collected dataset of activist hedge fund campaigns across 
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With respect to shareholder protection, LLSV developed an anti-director rights index (ADRI), using six variables that were intended to capture how strongly the legal system favours minority shareholders against the board of directors and managers in the corporate decision-making process. 20 Of the six ADRI variables, the first three ('proxy mail allowed', 'shares not blocked before the meeting', 'cumulative voting') are concerned with shareholder voting, while the other three relate to the following matters: the availability of a legal mechanism for minority shareholders (who own 10% of share capital or less) to seek redress in case of expropriation by directors; the degree to which the law provided for shareholders to have pre-emption rights in respect of new share issues; and the ability of shareholders owning more than 10% of a company's share capital to call a shareholders' meeting.
LLSV allocated each country a '0' or '1' for each variable. They then drew on the aggregate values of these shareholder protection proxies as independent variables in statistical regressions and reported correlations between the extent of legally mandated 19 LLSV 'Law and Finance' supra note 2 at 1129. 20 LLSV also used two additional variables as proxies for shareholder protection: 'one share, one vote', and 'mandatory dividend'. See ibid., 1126-34.
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shareholder protection, on the one hand, and various financial and ownership structure indicators, on the other. The main hypothesis was-and still is-that better investor protection (measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of their enforcement) results in better-developed capital markets.
LLSV also drew on the work of prominent traditional comparatists to group their sample countries into legal families/origins, 21 and they compared the legal origin of the law they studied with the resulting indices. 22 LLSV found that good shareholder protection, as measured by the ADRI, had a quantifiable effect on financial development ('law matters')
and that the quality of law varied with the origin of a country's legal system ('legal origin matters'). Taking these two elements together, they concluded that this meant that legal origin affects economic growth in an exogenous, or independent, way. 23 In other words, their findings suggest that international differences in the ownership structures and other financial mechanisms of corporate governance are due to differences in the legal and institutional framework within which firms operate.
The quantification of shareholder protection rules by LLSV was a path-breaking innovation and the original ADRI has been widely used as a measure for shareholder protection in many follow-up studies to establish correlations in a wide variety of subjects, some well beyond economic development. 24 The impact of this line of research has been enormous, with the World Bank taking the LLSV findings into account in order to assess the quality of law and legal institutions. 25 Along with its enormous impact, however, the original ADRI has come under serious attack. A number of scholars have criticised the index for coding errors, 26 selected as proxies for shareholder protection. In order to express these variables in numerical terms, the researcher devises a coding algorithm (or schema) which sets out the areas of law to be taken into account (eg statutory and case law or listing rules) and the types of rules to be coded (eg mandatory vs default rules). In addition to the primary sources, the coding algorithm includes a measurement scale of binary (0.1) or non-binary coding (eg ½, ¼).
Finally, the researcher has to decide whether and/or how the variables will be weighted. The final result is an index that can be used to reveal trends over time in legal changes and to make inferences, ie using facts we know to learn about facts that we do not know.
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As part of its quantitative research, the CBR team coded the development of shareholder protection for over three decades across five countries (Germany, France, the UK, the US and India) and built an index of shareholder protection with 60 variables. 39 Subsequently, the CBR researchers extended the shareholder protection index to 20 countries using ten variables as proxies for shareholder protection law over the period 36 been extended across 30 countries between 1990 and 2013. 41 The ten variables of the CBR-SPI take non-binary scores between 0 (indicating little or no shareholder protection) and 1 (indicating strong shareholder protection). 42 The first two variables cover issues relating to the power of the general meeting for de facto changes (ie sale of more than 50% of the company's assets) ( The development of the CBR-SPI is based on coding methods which have sought to address limitations inherent to the ADRI.
First, the CBR-SPI has reviewed the mechanisms by which shareholder protection rules affect financial development by working with a better understanding of both corporate law and comparative law principles. For instance, the choice of variables and the scores given to them reflect the idea of 'functional equivalents', according to which different legal systems may achieve the same goal through different means, depending on local contexts and conditions. 43 By embracing the functional method, the CBR researchers were attempting to place numerical comparative law within the traditional comparative law methodological framework, and to create legal indices that could better represent the law in any given jurisdiction. The CBR team also tries to minimise any 'home bias' by identifying a more generally representative set of variables as the basis for coding. 44 9
Further, the CBR-SPI takes into account a wider range of legal and regulatory information. 45 Whereas LLSV focused on formal legal rules protecting shareholders from oppressive treatment on the part of the incumbents, the CBR-SPI includes not only relevant statutory law and court decisions, but also self-regulatory rules such as provisions found in soft law codes of corporate governance and take-over regulations. Unlike LLSV, the CBR-SPI also takes into account both mandatory and default rules. Another issue that the CBR team considered is that of the weighting of the variables. The CBR-SPI uses continuous or graduated scores on a 0-1 scale to capture the degree of variation in the strength of a rule, as opposed to the dichotomous, or binary, ones used by LLSV. A further key methodological difference between the ADRI and the CBR-SPI is that, in the latter, lawyers trained in the jurisdictions did the actual coding. 46 More importantly, the CBR-SPI is longitudinal so as to make possible to track the process of legal change over time in a systematic way, while the ADRI only provides cross-sectional data and fails to examine the time-variant relationship between legal change and stock market development.
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The construction of the CBR-SPI was not done for its own sake, but in order to facilitate statistical testing of posited relationships between shareholder protection rules, on the one hand, and economic outcomes, on the other. The CBR researchers found that the quality of shareholder protection rules is positively correlated to the stock market development only in common law countries and in developing ones. 48 This means that shareholder protection rules have an independent, long-run causal effect on financial development only in some national contexts. It was suggested that the results indicated that legal systems are 'quasi-endogenous' with regard to the economy in the sense of being shaped, to a certain extent, by their economic and political environment. 49 In the corporate governance context, this implies that shareholder-orientated corporate rules can operate as exogenous independent variables, capable of shaping the behaviour of corporate governance actors in the ways suggested by the legal origins theory and also, potentially, in other ways. phenomenon, namely the brand of shareholder activism associated with activist hedge funds, is shaped by shareholder protection rules, and examine how leximetrics can be used to investigate whether cross-country differences in shareholder protection account for the emergence of hedge fund activism.
LEXIMETRICS AND HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM

The Incidence and Nature of International Hedge Fund Activism
Shareholder activism, particularly of the type engaged in by activist hedge funds and other active asset managers, is a recent, but now prominent, topic in academic and policy debates in corporate governance. Activist hedge funds first appeared in the United States in the late 1990s, but they moved to the forefront in the mid-2000s. 51 The feature which distinguishes hedge fund activism from other forms of shareholder engagement with portfolio companies is its proactive nature. Conventional institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, are typically reactive. They intervene only when they perceive that a portfolio company is underperforming. Rather than react to events of underperformance or deficient management, activist hedge funds proactively initiate changes. This style of engagement has two defining features:
first, it presupposes the active accumulation of an equity stake as a departure pointactivist hedge funds either do not have a pre-existing stake in the target company, or they have a small one which they quickly increase when they decide to adopt a handson strategy; and second, activist hedge funds aim to change the policies of the targeted companies in order to extract value. generate abnormal stock returns, particularly around the announcement date of the activist event. 53 Recent empirical evidence further suggests that activist hedge funds are not only able to achieve their investment objective of profiting from shareholder activism, but can also provide a form of discipline, especially against the agency problems associated with free cash flow, and can create improved long-term performance.
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As activist hedge funds in the United States had become successful in generating above-market rates of return for the funds and their investors, they turned to other markets in The nature of the oversight activities and the outcomes of hedge fund activism also vary considerably across different countries. I have elsewhere presented evidence suggesting that hedge fund activism encompasses a wide range of strategies, from letter writing and meetings with the incumbents (gentle activism), to public pressure or shareholder proposals (soft activism), and to the drama of a change of management or the commencement of litigation or a takeover bid from the activist (aggressive activism). 59 In order to examine the aggression of each activist hedge fund campaign in my sample, I split the activist campaigns 59 Katelouzou 'Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism' supra note 52 at 484-88.
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into three groups: those which include only gentle and soft tactics; those which include only aggressive tactics; and those which include both gentle/soft and aggressive tactics (mix campaigns). the overwhelming majority of activist campaigns involve at least one aggressive tactic (80%, 68% and 63.3%, respectively).
Fig. 2 Aggression of Hedge Fund Activism by Target Country
The success rate of hedge fund activism differs across countries as well. 15 funds choose to invest in a particular company and, more generally, in a particular country.
The target selection is surely determined by firm-specific factors. Existing empirical literature suggests that activist hedge funds tend to select undervalued and underperforming firms (yet not unprofitable), with dispersed (institutional) ownership, relatively small size, high cash flows and excessive diversification. 65 However, although activist hedge funds invest in specific companies rather than whole markets, the effort required to start looking at companies in any particular country implies that there will need to be at least some general country-level attraction before activist hedge funds begin their research. Law, and in particular shareholder protection, has a role to play in this regard.
Shareholder Rights and Hedge Fund Activism
The literature concerning the relationship between law and economic activity is vast and spans a range of disciplines from law to economics and from sociology to political science.
66
We have seen above that the 'law and finance' literature gave support to the claim that the level of shareholder protection matters for the financial development of a country. Empirical literature in finance also suggests that strong shareholder rights discipline managerial behaviour and influence a number of firm polices. For instance, stronger shareholder protection reduces insiders' incentives to expropriate, and thus, it mitigates the agency conflicts. 67 Here, the focus is on the legal foundations of a particular corporate governance phenomenon, namely hedge fund activism.
To unpack the legal factors which may be expected to influence hedge fund activism, an activist hedge fund campaign can be described as a sequence of four stages. An activist hedge fund manager first selects a target company that presents high-value opportunities for engagement (entry stage) and accumulates a nontrivial stake (trading stage). It then communicates its demands to the targeted management and employs its activist strategy (disciplining stage). Finally, it exits (exit stage). While the entry and trading stages will be also present to other forms of value investing, the readiness to take a hands-on role and lobby for changes (disciplining stage) is the crucial additional dimension to hedge fund activism.
The legal and extra-legal factors likely to influence the four stages of an activist hedge fund 65 
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campaign have been examined elsewhere. 68 The details will not be rehearsed here.
Nevertheless, a distilled synopsis of the legal factors conducive to hedge fund activism provides a helpful departure point for understanding the relationship between shareholder rights and hedge fund activism.
At the entry stage of an activist campaign, finding the right target is a function of the firm-specific information that is publicly available. If disclosure is mandated, it is easier for the activist hedge funds to identify their targets. 69 Although mandatory disclosure operates independently of activist hedge fund campaigns, financial reporting via annual accounts and periodic reports and information on the corporate governance arrangements of the candidate target company (eg disclosure of executive compensation and self-dealing) improves the activist hedge fund's effectiveness in selecting its target, and makes monitoring less costly.
At the trading stage of an activist campaign, harsh ownership disclosure duties on significant holdings may have a chilling effect on hedge fund activism. Strict disclosure duties (either with having lower thresholds or with catching non-voting economic positions and activist intentions) limit expected returns for prospective activists. 70 For instance, given the costs associated with building up a sizeable stake and the benefits associated with accumulating a stake anonymously, activist hedge funds have an incentive to hide their presence and to remain below the triggering ownership threshold at the beginning of their activist campaign.
Finally, we have seen above that at the disciplining stage activist hedge funds employ an array of tactics, most of the times in an interrelated manner. The intensity and effectiveness of the activist hedge funds' actions at the disciplining stage depend decisively on the degree of pressure they can bring to bear as shareholders. Activist hedge funds often use the general meeting to air their demands, initiating resolutions or vetoing fundamental decisions (eg the sale of the company). 71 At other times they take remedial action in the form of board dismissals and election of new directors, who look on the activist demands more favourably. 72 In challenging the incumbents' decisions, the right to appoint and remove the board directors is the most persuasive tool. Indeed, it has been suggested that the mere threat that the activist hedge fund will replace the board is enough to make the incumbents comply 68 with the activist's demands. 73 In addition to governance and removal rights, an alternative route for an activist hedge fund seeking to lessen the directors' resistance to its campaign is to threaten, or actually pursue, litigation on behalf of the company against the alleged wrongdoing director(s) (derivative claims), or recourse to litigation in the context of M&As, with the aim of blocking a deal or improving its terms. 74 However, not all activist strategies recourse to the power which corporate law has vested to shareholders. For instance, almost 60% of the activist strategies in the sample studied involve behind-the-scenes negotiations, approaches to the target management through letters and meetings, and the use of media to publicly articulate activist demands. 75 caveats and qualifications that would have rendered it unreadable'. 76 Also, in the absence of quantitative tools to measure similarities and differences, any conclusion on whether shareholder protection rules are more or less similar suffers from a high degree of 18 subjectivity. 77 Leximetric coding techniques can therefore provide a systematic way of studying differences and similarities across a large number of legal systems and if combined with econometric techniques can enrich our understanding of how law and economic activity affect each other. Before I turn to the empirical findings, the next section briefly describes the data.
Description of Data
In order to address the research hypothesis, which is the focus here, data on activist hedge fund campaigns, financial and ownership information on listed companies and comparative shareholder protection law were collected from various sources.
Dependent Variables
To test the research hypothesis, my basic empirical approach is to model hedge fund activism as the dependent variable in a regression framework. I, therefore, create a variable (ACTIVISM), which counts how often activist hedge funds target companies incorporated in the countries studied. For example, for the UK this variable has a score of 128, as this is the number of activist hedge fund campaigns targeting UK companies, while for Germany the score is 30 (see also Figure 1 above).
In a joint project, Na Dai and I pursued a more advanced econometric analysis of the legal foundations of international hedge fund activism. 78 To test whether the incidence of hedge fund activism is associated with stronger shareholder protection, we constructed a set of industry/size matched firms. The total number of matched firms is 5,231. To test whether the probability of being targeted by activist hedge funds is conditional on shareholder protection we constructed a binary variable (TARGET) that equals 1 if the company is a target of hedge fund activism, and 0 otherwise. 
Shareholder Protection Rules
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The key causal (independent) variable of interest is the degree of shareholder protection of the country in which the target company is incorporated. To account how well different legal systems protect certain rights I draw on the 30-country CBR-SPI. 79 
Control Variables
To isolate the relationship between hedge fund activism (dependent variable) and the shareholder protection rules (independent variable), I control for several additional legal and non-legal factors (both at country-and firm-level) that previous literature suggests are relevant to hedge fund activism and, more generally, to shareholder activism. 82 For instance, I
take into account the degree of law enforcement, the stringency of the mandatory disclosure regime, and the legal origin of the country in which the target company is incorporated. At the firm-level, I control for several financial characteristics, such as the operational performance and the size of the target company.
Main Empirical Findings
Together, the collected data on activist hedge fund campaigns, targeted companies and shareholder protection law measures provide a basis on which one can test the hypothesis that 20 shareholder protection accounts for hedge fund activism. Inferential statistics (through the use of regression analysis) can tell us whether any observed differences in the hedge fund activism emergence between weak and strong shareholder protection regimes can be accounted for purely by chance, or whether meaningful differences exist. In the latter case, we would say that the difference is statistically significant. Multivariate regression analysis can also provide an estimate of the relative impact of multiple factors on hedge fund activism.
In addition, by holding all these additional (control) factors constant we can assess the relationship of interest, ie the relationship between hedge fund activism and shareholder protection rules.
To ascertain whether shareholder protection rules account for the incidence of hedge fund activism, several empirical tests were performed. Statistical details are beyond the scope of this article. Here, for the purposes of illustration, it is sufficient to present a summary of the main findings.
The dependent variable ACTIVISM is a count variable, which measures how often activist hedge funds target companies incorporated in 25 different countries between 2000 and 2010. ACTIVISM takes values from 0 to 128, but the distribution is not bell-shaped, because of the large numberH of countries with zero activist hedge fund campaigns and the fact that activist hedge fund campaigns located in companies located in the UK and Japan dominate the sample. 83 To make allowances for the skewed (to the right) distribution I estimate, among others, negative binomial regression models. This type of non-linear regression is necessary when the dependent variable exhibits excess variation, or overdispersion, ie the variance (a measure of the variability in a data set) is larger than the mean. 84 The regression results show that legal support for shareholders' rights is related with a higher number of activist campaigns even after controlling for the impact of alternative factors. 85 This suggests that the willingness of activist hedge funds to entry to a company and engage in disciplining activities is contingent upon the extent to which they are protected from shareholder value destroying actions from the management.
The dependent variable TARGET is a binary variable. A binary dependent variable has two values, typically coded as 0 for a negative outcome (ie the event is not aggressive or it is unsuccessful) and 1 as a positive outcome (ie the event is aggressive or it is successful). To assess the extent to which shareholder protection help to account for the probability of a 83 Katelouzou 'Hedge Fund Activism' supra note 18 at 174-75. 84 Ibid., 175-76. 85 Ibid., 177-78.
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company becoming an activist target, a probit regression is employed. Probit regression allows a researcher to explore the way in which each explanatory variable (predictor) affects the probability of an event occurring. After controlling for several additional firm-and country-level factors, the regression results show that the coefficient on the shareholder protection variable is as expected, namely positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. 86 A graphic display of the main results is presented in Figure 4 . and Variable 9, are relevant to hedge fund activism.
Variable 6 reflects how easily directors can be dismissed. The highest score of 1 is given where directors may be dismissed by shareholders at will, while the lowest score (0) is
We have seen before that if management is not receptive to any of the hedge funds'
recommendations, the insurgents can take a more aggressive approach and threaten or actually wage a campaign in order to dismiss what they think as underperforming directors.
Variable 6 is, in turn, fundamentally important for hedge fund activism.
On the other hand, Variable 9 relates to the mandatory bid rule. Mandatory bid is included in the original CBR-SPI because it gives shareholders an opportunity to exit the company at a premium. 90 Greater protection is hence accorded by a lower threshold acquisition level. For activist hedge funds an exit at a premium is an optimal outcome, since a mandatory bid rule ensures that activist hedge funds as shareholders of the potential target company have an opportunity to exit on a change of control. 91 However, the mandatory bid rule also runs the risk of reducing the number of takeovers which occur. Economic literature shows that the mandatory-bid requirement decreases the likelihood of value-creating restructuring as it makes control transactions more expensive and in turn discourages bidders from making a bid in the first place. 92 Correspondingly, activist hedge funds would prefer more, not fewer, bids, meaning they should oppose a mandatory bid rule. 93 Another reason why activist hedge funds should oppose a mandatory bid rule might be that hedge funds may refrain from launching a takeover bid themselves if they are obliged to make an offer to purchase the remaining shares of a company on passing a certain threshold. The financial burden seems to be significant if we take into account the fact that, because the target's company share price increases upon announcement of the major shareholding, the minimum price for the mandatory bid also increases. 94 However, this latter point is at best subsidiary, given that activist hedge funds rarely come close to a 30% stake. 95 In addition, existing literature in the United States, where the would-be-acquirers can bid as even in the absence of a mandatory bid rule activist hedge funds rarely attempt to take over the target company. 97 In turn, Variable 9 is likely to have either none or only a minor impact on hedge fund activism. Future research should, therefore, re-consider the selection of the variables for inclusion in an index that will measure the ease with which an activist hedge fund can entry in a company, accumulate a sizeable stake, engage in oversight activities and exit. Future research should also address the question of what weight each variable should contribute to the final legal index.
Another inherent limitation of quantitative corporate law studies is that the principal methodological tool-linear regression-only estimates the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, and tells us nothing about the direction of causation. 98 There is nothing in the data themselves that can be used to determine if x (shareholder protection) is a cause of y (hedge fund activism). A regression analysis can only be used to predict what would happen to y if x is set at a particular value. Therefore, I might have found that the incidence of activist hedge fund campaigns and probability of being targeted through activism are greater in countries with stronger shareholder protection, but this does not mean that we necessarily have good evidence of the direction of causal inference. Both variables might be influenced by a common cause (and therefore correlated with one another), but might not cause each other. This limitation is also associated with the theorisation of the lawhedge fund activism relationship. A central methodological tenet of this study is the claim that corporate law operates, at least in part, as an 'exogenous' or independent force influencing the emergence of hedge fund activism. However, it is possible that legal rules not only shape, but also are shaped, by their economic context. 99 In the relationship between shareholder protection rules and hedge fund activism, however, the direction of causation appears to run mainly one way, from shareholder rights to hedge fund activism. The For comparatists, this article shows how leximetric coding techniques and statistical analysis can help to analyse the effects of regulatory regimes on corporate governance. The 103 Buchanan, Chai and Deakin 'Empirical Analysis of Legal Institutions and Institutional Change' supra note 50. 104 Buchanan, Chai and Deakin 'Hedge Fund Activism in Japan' supra note 101 at 13.
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question about the effect of legal rules on corporate governance or other social or economic phenomena is of interest to comparatists and socio-legal researchers, 105 and it has also been empirically explored by the 'law and finance' literature. This empirically informed assessment of the effects of legal rules is not limited to corporate governance and related fields, but can also be of value in other types of comparative research. Numerical comparative law can be used to identify legal transplants, to evaluate the importance of legal families, to test whether various legal rules (not only in company law) matter, and to make comparisons as a basis for making policy recommendations. 106 Yet the possibility of creating numerical measures of legal rules is highly controversial.
For instance, it has been said that the quantification of comparative law and the proliferation of the 'law and finance' literature has led to a certain amount of 'existential angst' in the discipline of comparative law. 
